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The US dollar’s continuing hegemony as an international currency: 
a double-matrix analysis 
 
Annina Karltenbrunner and Photis Lysandrou  
 
Abstract 
The standard framework for debating the international currency system provides an 
opening to doubts about the dollar’s continuing hegemonic position because it provides an 
opening to doubts about the US’ ability to finance its external liabilities in the face of 
worsening economic fundamentals. This paper closes down these openings by adding to 
the usual matrix linking money’s international functions to two different types of agents, 
private and official, a second matrix linking money’s functions to two different types of 
commodities, material goods and services on the one hand and financial securities on the 
other. Once it is understood that bonds and equities are now not only types of funding 
instrument but also types of commodity whose use values to the world’s large investors 
are to serve as stores of value, it is then possible to understand why the huge size of the 
US capital markets will long continue to bind foreign investors to the dollar because it will 
be long before other capital markets will reach a comparable size.  
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1. Introduction 
The US dollar’s current hegemonic position in the international currency system is not in 
doubt. What is in doubt is whether the US dollar will continue to maintain this position in the 
foreseeable future. Had this particular question been resolved, then so too would have been 
the question as to why there is no other currency that can seriously challenge the dollar in the 
international arena for this is simply the same question in reverse. That there is no sign of any 
such resolution is evidenced by a recent collection of academic papers debating the current 
state of the international currency system1. In his introductory overview of these papers, 
Jonathan Kirshner observed that while all of the authors agreed that the one remaining pillar 
holding up the dollar’s leading position in the system was “the lack of plausible alternatives” 
there was no agreed explanation as to why this was the case. As Kirshner put it: “If not the 
                                                          
1 See Review of International Political Economy, October, 2014, Special Issue: Focus on the 
International Currency System  
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dollar, what? At the moment, there remains no satisfactory answer to this question”. (2014, 
p.1014)   
This paper attempts to provide the kind of satisfactory answer that is requested. It does this 
by addressing what we consider to be a major shortcoming in the current debate on the 
international currency question, namely, the acceptance of the conventional view of bonds as 
being only a type of ‘debt’. On this view, it must follow that the growth in size of the US 
government and corporate bond markets, which are at the heart of the US capital markets, 
may reach a point where foreign agents begin to doubt the US’ abilities to service its debt and 
thus begin to switch to another currency belonging to a country or region with stronger 
economic fundamentals and thus with more easily serviceable levels of debt. Our core 
argument is that bonds are now not only a type of debt but also a type of ‘commodity’ whose 
use value to the world’s large investors, along with that of equities, is to serve as a portable 
store of value. What follows from this argument is that the huge size of the US capital 
markets is the critical factor that not only binds foreign agents to the dollar in the present but 
will also continue to do so long into the future because it will be long before any other 
national or regional capital markets can reach a comparable size.  
The rest of this paper divides into five sections. Section two outlines the standard ‘money 
function-agent motivation’ matrix that frames the current economic debate on the 
international currency system. Section three adds to the usual six-cell matrix linking money’s 
three functions to the motivations of two types of agents, private and official, a second six-
cell matrix linking money’s functions to two types of commodities, goods and services on the 
one hand and financial securities on the other. Section four uses this double matrix 
framework to help explain the US dollar’s present hegemony as an international currency. 
Section five goes on to use this same framework to explain why no other currency is likely to 
challenge dollar hegemony any time soon. Section six concludes.  
 
2. The money function-agent motivation matrix 
A recent paper by Cohen and Benney (2014; henceforth C-B) provides an excellent summary 
of the money function-agent motivation matrix framework first introduced by Cohen (1971)2,    
and now used by many political economists in debating the dollar’s future as an international 
                                                          
2 See also Kenen (1983) and Krugman (1984) 
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currency .3 After first explaining why the creation of a supranational currency is an 
impossibility in today’s political conditions and why, therefore, a few national currencies 
have to be elevated to the role of international currency, C-B proceed to outline the standard 
economic criteria behind this elevation. As shown in Table 1, these criteria are determined by 
the demands made by two types of agents, private and official, on the three functions of 
money. Thus a national currency has to fulfil six roles in its capacity as international 
currency: at the private level it must serve as a vehicle for foreign-exchange trading (the 
medium of exchange function), as an instrument for trade invoicing and settlement (the unit 
of account function combined with that of medium of exchange) and as a means of 
facilitating cross-border investment (the store of value function); at the official level it must 
serve as an intervention currency (medium of exchange), an exchange rate anchor (unit of 
account) and as a reserve currency (store of value).  
Table 1: The roles of international money 
Functions of money 
Levels of 
analysis 
Medium of exchange  Unit of account Store of value 
Private Vehicle currency (foreign exchange 
trading), trade settlement 
Trade invoicing Investment 
currency 
Official  Intervention currency Exchange rate 
anchor 
Reserve 
currency  
Source: Cohen and Benney (2014) 
 
C-B go on to provide a comprehensive empirical picture of the shares taken by different 
national currencies in fulfilling these functions. What is immediately clear from the summary 
data shown in table 2 is that the international currency system is still a long way from 
becoming a genuinely multipolar one in that the US dollar continues to predominate in most 
areas of international currency use. C-B also provide a further and more precise quantitative 
estimation of the inequalities at the top of the currency pyramid by using two concentration 
ratios drawn from the economics discipline: the conventional concentration ratio (N-entity 
ratio) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that measures the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of all N entities occupying a particular market. The results derived from the 
comprehensive evaluation of all currency functions and the use of these concentration ratios 
                                                          
3 While we acknowledge that there are other important theoretical approaches to the question of international 
currency supremacy (see e.g. Helleiner and Kirshner 2009a for a general overview) our concern is specifically 
with the economic or market-based approach, for which reason we take the C-B paper as our cue.   
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give strong empirical support to C-B’s conclusion that the US dollar’s hegemony as an 
international currency remains solid for the time being. To quote: “Contrary to the popular 
impression of an emerging multipolarity in the global currency system, we find little evidence 
of a higher level of competition. Quite the opposite, in fact. Even today there appears to be 
one true pole in the system- namely, the US dollar. The euro lags behind considerably; also-
rans like the yen, pound sterling, and Swiss franc are at best niche players; and the yuan is so 
far back in the race that it barely even registers as yet” (2014, p.1038) 
Table 2. Percentage share of currencies in selected international capacities (2010) 
 Vehicle Banking Securities Reserve Average 
US dollar 42.5 43.7 37.8 61.5 48.1 
Euro 19.6 39.4 46 26.2 29.5 
Yen 8.5 3.7 2.6 2.9 4.4 
Sterling 7.5 5.7 8 4.7 6.5 
Swiss Franc 3.2 1.5 1.4 0.2 1.5 
Other Currencies 18.3 7 4.2 4.4 8.5 
Source: Cohen and Benney (2014) 
 
The data may show that the dollar maintains its hegemonic position today, but the question 
remains as to whether the dollar will continue to maintain this position tomorrow. This question 
needs to be answered analytically but the problem here is that the analytical framework used 
by C-B can provide no definite answer one way or the other. The basic reason for this 
framework’s neutrality in respect of the dollar’s continuing global hegemony comes down to 
the fact that while it specifies the types of demands made by agents on the functions of money 
it does not specify the types of commodities that are the object of monetary exchange. This 
omission reflects an unquestioning acceptance of the conventional view that only material 
goods and services qualify as commodities while financial securities merely represent funding 
instruments issued by corporations and governments to facilitate their production of 
commodities. What this view of securities then leads to is a highly ambivalent position 
regarding the relation between the unusually large size of the US capital markets and the 
international use of the dollar. On the one hand, there is the argument that the various 
advantages conferred by the size of these markets, including liquidity and network advantages, 
are a source of great attraction for foreign investors and therefore something that binds the 
latter to the use of the dollar (see e.g. Thimann, 2008; McNamara, 2008; Helleiner, 2008, 2009; 
James 2009). On the other hand, the fact that bonds in particular are only viewed as a type of 
debt can lead to the very different argument that the growing volume of US government and 
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corporate bonds held by foreign investors may reach a critical point where these investors begin 
to be concerned about the US’ repayment abilities and thus begin to abandon the dollar.  
Cohen himself reached just such a pessimistic conclusion in a paper published in 2009. While 
he was then just as sceptical of the chances of other national currencies assuming an hegemonic 
position in the global currency system as he is in his 2014 paper, he was also at that point in 
time more certain that the US’ accumulating foreign debt would soon see a dollar-led global 
currency system replaced by a more fragmented system. To quote: “I do not consider the 
persistent build-up of America’s foreign debt as sustainable for long. Unless reversed by 
significant policy reform in Washington, the US economy’s dependence on foreign capital 
must be expected in time to erode the advantages historically enjoyed by the greenback, 
creating an opportunity for challengers. Three currencies are most frequently mentioned as 
potential challengers for the dollar’s crown- the euro, yen and yuan….my assessment is 
sceptical. None of the three candidates appears capable of making a serious challenge to the 
dollar; certainly none is likely to surpass the greenback in the foreseeable future. Rather, the 
more plausible outcome is one in which the dollar’s supremacy is eroded but no other single 
currency manages to replace it. In Jonathan Kirshner’s terms, the dollar will become one of 
several ‘peer competitors’ in a fragmented currency system, with no dominant leader” (2009, 
p.143).  
Cohen, writing in 2009, may not have gone so far as to predict that the euro would take over 
the lead international role from the dollar, but other pessimists did so when writing a little 
earlier before the full effects of the financial crisis would become painfully evident. The 2008 
paper by Chinn and Frankel is a good example. In that paper the authors by no means ignored 
the important role played by the size of the US capital markets in supporting the dollar’s 
international role. On the contrary, they gave it explicit recognition for as they stated when 
listing the determinants of a currency’s international status: “ capital and money markets in the 
home country must be not only open and free of controls, but also deep and well-developed” 
(2008, p57). This said, Chinn and Frankel nevertheless assigned overriding priority to 
underlying economic fundamentals in the matter of international currency determination, from 
which standpoint they then predicted that the dollar would lose its position as the leading 
international currency by 2015 not only because “the euro now exists as a more serious 
potential rival than the mark or yen were” but also because “the United States by now has a 25 
year history of chronic current account deficits and the dollar has a 35 year history of trend 
depreciation” (ibid.p. 51). To give added weight to their prediction, Chinn and Frankel cited 
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the experience of the British pound to the effect that, while inertia and persistence helped to 
maintain its international supremacy well into the 20th century long after the UK had been 
overtaken by the US as the world’s leading industrial power, the eventual “dethronement” of 
the pound by the dollar was an inevitability that “reflected long-run trends in economic 
fundamentals” (ibid.p50).4   
While the Eurozone crisis has for the time being put paid to claims that the euro is about to 
challenge dollar hegemony, there are those who argue that such a challenge will soon be posed 
by the yuan (Hu 2008, IMF 2011, Chen, Peng, and Shu 2009, Dobson and Masson 2008, 
Subramanian 2011).5 The argument is based on the observation that China’s economy will 
soon displace the US economy as the world’s largest and on the contention that it will then 
only be a matter of time before China’s government introduces policies, including capital 
account liberalisation and the lifting of all restrictions on the yuan’s convertibility, which will 
allow China’s economic supremacy to find reflection in the international currency system. C-
B have objected to these claims on the grounds that those advancing them have tended to use 
arguments and data sets relating to just one or other of the six international currency functions, 
typically the reserve currency function. While we agree with this particular criticism, we also 
believe that it is precisely the aforementioned deficiencies in the standard economic approach 
to the international currency question that allow predictions about the coming end of dollar 
hegemony to be made. To give space to the argument that this position can only be temporarily 
sustained in face of the US’ worsening economic fundamentals through the power of inertia is 
to give space to the conclusion that all that is required to put an end to this inertia is for just 
one group of agents (e.g. the Chinese authorities) to introduce just the right kind of policies 
that would have just the right impact in one or other of the international currency segments 
(e.g. that for reserve holdings).     
We believe that if predictions about the imminent demise of US dollar hegemony are to be laid 
to rest, thus allowing a more serious and realistic discussion about the future shape of the 
international currency system, the standard economic framework for debating these issues must 
show not only how the US capital markets attract foreign agents to the dollar as a matter of 
choice but also how these markets force foreign agents to stay with the dollar as a matter of 
                                                          
4 Comparisons with the trajectory of the UK Pound Sterling and its inertia in remaining the world’s global 
currency is very common in the literature on the future of the US dollar (see e.g. Eichengreen 2005, 2010, 
Bergsten 2005, McKinnon 2005).  
5 Authors that are more critical of the rise of the Chinese yuan include (Gao and Yu 2011, Wu, Pan,and Wang 
2010, Bowles and Wang 2008, Chey 2012, Eichengreen 2009).   
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necessity. We further believe that this task can only achieved by showing that capital market 
securities now constitute not only a means of financing the production of commodities but also 
commodities in their own right. The next section expands on this argument.  
   
3. The money function-commodity type matrix 
The term ‘commodity’ can be used in various ways; for example, to denote any good or 
service that is offered for sale or, as in the case of the financial markets, to denote a particular 
subset of physical assets such as wheat, gold, or oil. Here we follow Marx and define 
commodity as any entity that (i) has both a use value and an exchange value and (ii) whose 
exchange value is determined against social standards rather than fixed by private 
negotiation. Our central proposition is that financial securities have become commodities in 
this latter sense, a development that, as illustrated in table 3, implies that money must 
duplicate its three major functions to facilitate the circulation of these financial commodities 
in addition to that of material commodities. 
Table 3. The Money Function-Commodity Type Matrix 
 
As financial securities could only have become commodities because certain agents treat 
them as such, the question arises as to who are these agents. The answer will not be found on 
the supply side of the securities markets because governments and corporations will always 
classify the securities they issue merely as alternative types of financing instrument rather 
than as a distinct type of commodity as shown in table 3.To find those agents that do treat 
financial securities as commodities in their own right we need to look at the demand side of 
the securities markets, which in recent decades has witnessed a significant change in investor 
composition. In previous eras, it was household investors that were the dominant group of 
                Money’s 
                Functions 
Commodity 
Types 
 
Unit of account 
    
Medium of exchange 
 
Store of value 
  
Material Commodities 
(goods and services) 
 
Price assignment 
 
Price realisation 
 
Financing transaction 
gaps 
 
 
Financial 
Commodities 
(securities) 
 
Price assignment 
 
Price realisation 
 
Financing  transaction 
gaps 
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securities buyers, a group that, not having to market asset portfolios to the public, never had 
cause to view these securities differently from the way that they were viewed by their issuers.  
In the current era, it is institutional asset managers who have emerged as the dominant group 
of security buyers6. This group does have cause to take a different, unconventional view of 
securities because of their intermediary role in the securities markets between the issuers on 
the one side and the end-buyers of their asset management services on the other.   
Once a small cottage industry catering for a few wealthy clients, asset management has 
become a mass industry catering for the retirement and other welfare needs of large sections 
of the population. Chief among the factors driving this transformation are population ageing, 
the rise in the wealth to income ratio and the ongoing privatisation of welfare provision 
(Davis and Steil, 2001; BIS, 2003; Grahl and Lysandrou, 2006; Haldane, 2014). With the 
growth in the scale of asset management has come a corresponding growth in the scale of 
demand for ‘investables’,  assets whose use vales are to serve as stores of value into which 
clients’ money can be poured and from which money can be withdrawn to repay clients. In 
principle, other assets such as real estate, gold and other natural commodities can also be 
used as value containers. However, the physical constraints on the supplies of these assets, 
combined with certain disadvantageous attributes, most notably a lack of liquidity7, mean that 
institutional investors have to depend on financial securities as the major type of investable 
asset. For household investors, the allocation of savings to financial securities is always an 
option rather than a necessity because as small, self-serving investors, there is nothing 
stopping them from diverting their savings to other, relatively illiquid, asset classes such as 
real estate or bank savings accounts. By contrast, no such latitude is open to the institutional 
and other large investors of today8: they can hold some proportion of their funds in other 
assets, but size factors combined with liquidity considerations mean that they must keep a 
substantial, if not the majority, proportion of their funds in tradable securities9.   
                                                          
6 The US experience illustrates the change in investor composition on the buy side of the capital markets. Where 
small household investors held 95% of US equity in 1945, that ratio had fallen to 23% by 2012. As regards US 
bonds, the ratio held by households is considerably smaller at between 9-10% (Goldman Sachs, 2013; 
Blackrock, 2014) 
7 In this paper we shall use the term ‘liquidity’ to signify the ease with which any entity and in any quantity can 
be sold with minimal impact on its price.  
8 By large investors we mean not only pension and mutual funds and insurance companies but also the asset 
management arms of banks, Sovereign Wealth Funds, High Net Worth Individuals and Hedge Funds. These 
groups today account for the overwhelming majority of security holdings (see e.g. Goda et.al. 2013; Lysandrou, 
2013; Goda and Lysandrou, 2014; BlackRock, 2014).  
9 For data on asset allocations of institutional investors see McKinsey (2011); for data on asset allocations of 
HNWI’s see Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management, (2015)  
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As stated, commodities in Marx’s sense are entities whose prices are determined against 
social standards rather than by private negotiation. In the case of financial securities this 
condition is absolutely indispensable to their new commodity function because without 
uniform transparency and governance standards against which the risks on securities can be 
compared and controlled the latter cannot be reliably used in a value storage role. In 
elaborating on this point, it is first useful to note the organisational changes in institutional 
asset management that have accompanied its growth in scale. The basic function of 
institutional investors is to generate higher returns subject to a given level of risk than is 
usually possible for non-professional investors (Davis and Steil, 2001). The traditional 
approach to executing this function was simply to advise clients as to how best to invest their 
money to attain their desired investment targets. However, while this personal approach may 
still be feasible for very wealthy clients it is too costly for the majority of households on 
average incomes. The more practical and cost efficient approach as far as this majority is 
concerned is to invert the usual relation between client objectives and investment outcomes: 
rather than directly advise clients, what asset management firms now tend to do is to put on 
offer a wide selection of standardised portfolios that are each managed to a specified mix of 
risk and return and then invite clients to place funds in those portfolios that match their 
particular risk appetites10. Given that the overall risk profile of a portfolio depends on the risk 
characteristics of its individual constituent securities, it becomes clear why the 
standardisation of asset management has been a major driving force behind the imposition of 
transparency and governance constraints on security issuing organisations that are 
substantively different to anything seen in the past. 
Consider first the question of transparency. For the household investors who were previously 
dominant on the buy side of the securities markets, it was enough that security issuers 
provided reasonably accurate information about their financial state. However, for the 
institutional investors of today who typically manage portfolios to a tightly specified 
investment target, and who thus need to cross compare securities on a like for like basis to 
determine which are suitable for selection, it is important that the financial information 
supplied by issuers be not only accurate but also be in a suitably compact and standardised 
format such as would allow for comparability. The clearest illustration of this point is to be 
found in the bond markets where all information relevant to a government or corporation’s 
                                                          
10 For further discussion of the shift towards more standardised forms of asset management provision see BIS, 
2003; Grahl and Lysandrou, 2006) 
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ability to service its debt collected by a ratings agency such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor 
is compressed into a single metric. This same point also applies in the equity markets. 
Systematic comparisons of corporate equities to determine which are suitable for inclusion in 
an equity portfolio can be an arduous and time-consuming process if portfolio managers are 
forced to rely on firms’ own particular criteria of profitability. By contrast, the selection 
process is greatly simplified if portfolio managers have at their disposal a standardised metric 
for comparing the financial health of corporations. This precondition was effectively met 
with the shift from the ‘historic cost’ accounting system, in which firms’ assets are valued 
according to their replacement costs, to the ‘fair value’ system in which firms’ assets and 
liabilities are both valued according to the prices that they command in the capital market11.  
 
Now consider the question of governance. As financial securities have no intrinsic value, 
unlike physical assets such as gold or real estate, their value storage capacities depend 
entirely on the regularity or assurance with which determinate amounts of cash are returned 
to investors.  The task of holding firm the quantitative dimension of equities has always been 
more difficult to achieve for shareholders because as co-owners of the corporations in which 
they have invested they are expected to share the risks of enterprise, which in practice means 
giving corporations the right to decide when, and how much, cash should be returned to them. 
However, this risk sharing feature of equities poses a dilemma for institutional investors 
trying to manage equity portfolios to pre-set targets. On the one hand, they need to give 
corporations some discretion over the level and timing of cash disbursements so as to ensure 
that these do not conflict with the finances needed to maintain the flow of production; but on 
the other hand they cannot give corporations complete discretion over cash disbursements as 
this could play havoc with the risk characteristics of equities and thus with those of the 
portfolios of which they are a constituent part. To help resolve this dilemma, institutional 
investors closely monitor and cross compare the governance practices of different 
corporations so as to determine which pay meaningful attention to shareholders’ interests and 
                                                          
11 The problem with historic cost accounting is not just that it hampers comparability, as would any accountancy 
method that treats firms as holistic and thus incommensurable entities inasmuch as they differ in their 
combinations of physical, human and financial capital. It is also that it gives corporate managers too much for 
scope for ‘story telling’. As Bromwich (2004, p. 42) has observed: the ‘underlying wish’ of accounting standard 
setters leading them to promote the fair value system ‘is for accounting to state things “as they are”, free of any 
managerial manipulation’. On the contrary, to allow managers to give their own estimates of items ‘that reflect 
differing managerial information and different preferences to the market . . . would mean that identical items 
would be valued differently’. 
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hence to decide which equities to buy. As in the case of accounting information, 
disaggregation and standardisation are the guiding principles behind the presentation of 
corporate governance information in a form that meets the stock selection requirements of 
institutional investors..12  
 
The value storage capacities of bonds are more tangible in that the payment of interest is 
obligatory. Even when interests fall to zero, or to sub-zero levels, as happens on certain 
government bonds, bonds still have a more tangible value storage capacity because of their 
known redemption value at maturity. However, the downside of bonds is that they can 
potentially force their issuers into default because of the concentration of risk that they are 
forced to carry. The threat of default is particularly acute in the case of business corporations 
whose profits can fluctuate sharply but who are still expected to service the interests on their 
bonds regardless of circumstances. Government bonds are by comparison generally safer 
because interest payments are financed out of tax revenues,13 a fact that explains why these 
bonds are so important to institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension 
funds who must at all times keep a certain stock of safe assets so as to be certain that 
obligations to clients can be met.  In addition to the greater safety of government bonds, it is 
also their greater volumes of supply across the maturity spectrum that is important to 
insurance companies and pension funds given their need to have large amounts of securities 
falling due at each maturity date so as to meet client demands14. Indeed, it is because of the 
vital role played by government bonds in institutionally managed portfolios that it is in 
respect of these securities in particular where the divergence between the view of securities as 
mere financing instruments and the view of securities as financial commodities finds its most 
acutely problematic manifestation. Governments typically see their bonds as nothing other 
than forms of debt that need to be redeemed quickly because debt is bad and needs to be 
                                                          
12An example of such a ratings metric, and now generally considered to be the industry standard, is the 
Governance Risk Indicator (GRid) marketed by the Risk Metrics group. 
13 This explains why government bonds are generally used by the credit rating agencies as the risk free 
benchmarks against which the risk premiums on corporate bonds are calculated and factored into their ratings. 
Of course, as not all governments have the same tax raising powers and as therefore the risk quality of the bonds 
issued by different governments will vary, the bonds of some governments are also used as the risk-free 
benchmarks for calculating the risk premiums on the bonds of other governments.  
14 Corporate bonds are a relatively heterogeneous class in the sense that they are spread out more thinly across 
different maturities because of the differences in the time profiles of the financing needs of different 
corporations (Fender and Lewrick, 2015).  This heterogeneity explains why corporate bonds are relatively less 
liquid as well as relatively less safe than are government bonds. This in turn explains why bond brokers, who at 
all times need to keep large inventories of bonds to meet the needs of their institutional clients, prefer for cost 
reasons to concentrate these inventories on government bonds. 
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avoided whenever possible. However, what may seem entirely rational from a government’s 
standpoint is highly irrational from the standpoint of insurance companies and other asset 
managers who not only need to hold certain amounts of safe government bonds even under 
good economic conditions but also need to increase their holdings of these bonds when 
economic conditions deteriorate and thus when the value storage capacities of corporate 
bonds become less dependable.         
 
To summarise, where once governments and corporations could only be considered as ‘single 
commodity’ providers, organisations whose sole function was to provide the material 
commodities that meet the production or consumption needs of firms and households, the 
recent structural changes in the asset management industry mean that governments and 
corporations have now effectively become  ‘dual commodity providers’, organisations whose 
additional function is to supply the financial commodities that meet the portfolio needs of 
institutional investors. And, as a result, where once money only had to facilitate the 
circulation of material commodities, the recent changes in the asset management industry 
mean that it now has to duplicate its major functions so as to facilitate the circulation of 
financial commodities. On the one hand, the increase in the scale of the industry means a 
corresponding increase in the need for money in its store of value role: as it takes time to buy 
securities to accommodate fund inflows from clients or to sell securities to finance fund 
outflows to clients, institutional investors always need to hold substantial amounts of funds in 
cash form so as to be able to temporarily bridge the gaps between these opposing flows15. On 
the other hand, the shift towards more standardised forms of asset management has brought 
with it an increased need for money in its unit of account and medium of exchange roles: 
organisations issuing securities use money as a unit of account to assign prices to these 
securities but it is through the realisation of these prices with the medium of exchange 
function of money that investors verify whether the risk-return quality of the securities 
offered for sale, and thus the prices charged, conform to prevailing transparency and 
governance standards.  
If money has to duplicate its major functions at the national level, then so also must it do so at 
the international level in light of the fact that institutional and other large investors have taken 
full advantage of capital control reductions and other recent regulatory developments to 
                                                          
15 For a recent discussion regarding the contribution of a growing asset management industry to the growth of 
institutional cash pools see Pozsar (2011). 
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include foreign securities in their portfolios16. This said, there are two fundamental 
differences that separate out the international context from the national one. The first 
difference, as already discussed above, is that at the international level money must perform 
its three functions in respect not only of the private sector but also of the official sector. The 
second difference concerns the relevance of the distinction between securities as financing 
instruments and securities as financial commodities. At the national level, this distinction 
may not appear to be significant because it will have no bearing on the choice of currency, 
and it will not do so simply because there is no such choice given the central government’s 
monopoly control of its domestic currency. By contrast, at the international level where a few 
national currencies must replicate their functions in the absence of a world currency and thus 
where the constraints on agents who use a foreign national currency in an international 
capacity are primarily economic in content17, the distinction between securities as financing 
instruments and securities as financial commodities is absolutely crucial because it has an 
absolutely crucial bearing on the nature of these economic constraints. There is no subject 
that illustrates this point more perfectly than the subject of dollar hegemony. 
 
4. The US dollar’s current hegemony as an international currency 
The US dollars’ hegemony as an international currency is partly self-reinforcing in that while 
it is the depth and liquidity of the US dollar market that makes the dollar the currency of 
choice for foreign agents engaged in speculative18, hedging19 or other currency exchange 
                                                          
16 BIS, 2003, p.13: “regulatory developments have resulted in a globalisation of institutional 
portfolios, with the focus moving more towards international asset classes. As a result of more 
diversification opportunities, home bias has tended to decline”. 
17 This is not to say that politics does not matter in the international sphere. Indeed, as Helleiner shows political 
factors shape the attractiveness of a currency both directly and indirectly (Helleiner, 2008). However, arguably, 
as long as we lack a truly global governance system, political factors will continue to bear more weight on the 
national or regional level rather than also on an international one.. 
18 For example, given its relatively low interest rate environment and deep financial markets, the US$ is one of 
the main funding currencies for international carry trade operations. This role cements the dollar’s predominant 
international role as investors have to acquire it to meet their outstanding external obligations (e.g. Galati et al. 
2007; McCauley and McGuire, 2008). This becomes particularly pertinent during moments of increased risk 
aversion which leads to a tightening of the international funding constraint (Brunnermeier, 2008). In addition to 
the carry trade, a more recent development that has served to boost daily turnover in the spot dollar market is 
high frequency trading: the use of sophisticated computers by hedge funds and other speculative vehicles to 
trade the same pair of currencies many times over in a single day so as to extract any profit generated by even 
the smallest disturbances in the prices of these currencies. See BIS, 2011; Gomber et.al.2011. 
19 Of the $5.3 trillion average daily turnover in the foreign exchange markets as of April, 2013 (BIS, 2013), 44% 
of this total comprised of FX swaps: instruments that combine spot and outright forward transactions between 
the same pair of currencies and the same pair of counterparties in a single transaction. While some proportion of 
FX swaps are used for hedging (or speculating on) the risks associated with currency exchange, another 
substantial proportion are used as an alternative type of repo, the difference being that key currencies rather 
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activities unrelated to underlying transactions20, it is the widespread use of the US dollar in 
these roles that in return helps to boost the depth and liquidity of the US dollar market. This 
said, dollar hegemony must have some grounding in the fact that, at a time when the world’s 
securities markets are increasingly dominating the world’s product markets as shown in 
figure 1, the US continues to be the world’s leading supplier of securities as shown in table 4. 
Figure 1. Financial Deepening of the Global Economy 
 
 
 
 
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 
World 
Deposits(Strillion) 
9 23 26 35 42 57 62 
World GDP 
($trillion) 
11 22 30 33 46 64 72 
      Source: Mckinsey (2013), IMF (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
government bonds are used as collateral (see Grahl and Lysandrou, 2003). As the dollar has the deepest and 
most liquid market, this is the currency that is most typically used in this collateral role (ECB, 2010). 
20 In 2012, US dollar denominated international bank lending accounted for more than 43% of the total.  
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Table 4. Country shares of world GDP, securities stocks and currency market activity, 2012 
 US Eurozone Japan UK China EMEs(ex 
China) 
% Share of World GDP 22.42 16.83 8.23 3.41 11.36 20.72 
% Share of World trade  10.74 24.62 4.35 3.60 9.94 27.29 
Net Trade (US$ bn)  
     Exports (US$bn) 
     Imports (US$bn) 
 
-58 
217 
276 
 
31 
581 
551 
 
-14 
93 
107 
 
-9.8 
78 
88 
 
17 
226 
210 
7.6 
631 
623 
% Share of World Securities 
(Total) 
    Equities 
    Bonds  
37.49 
35.11 
38.88 
19.58 
11.87 
24.11 
12.72 
6.92 
16.12 
6.13 
5.68 
6.39 
5.21 
6.95 
4.18 
 
19.52 
NA 
% Share of  World 
Currency Use 
56.92 33.75 8.74 8.56 1.31 8.94 
 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators; Bank for International Settlements; WTO-World Trade 
Statistics 
 
While the US’ respective shares of world GDP and of world trade in goods and services 
continue to be significant factors in the international use of the dollar as an international 
currency, it is foreign involvement in the US securities markets that now provides the more 
important explanation for this use. A steady trickle in the years before 2000, foreign capital 
flows into the US began to rise sharply from this time on as shown in figure 2, trade surpluses 
with the US being the principle source of the inflows from Asia and leverage in addition to 
surpluses being a major source of inflows from Europe (Bernanke et.al. 2011)21. As shown in 
figure 3, foreign investors are particularly prominent in the US treasuries market where they 
currently hold over 60% of the total amount outstanding (45% held by foreign official agents, 
15% held by foreign private agents). And as shown in figure 4, foreign ownership of US 
corporate securities is particularly pronounced in the corporate bond sector where the 
percentage share has averaged between 40% to 45% in recent years as compared to an 
average share of between 10% and 15% in the US corporate equity sector.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 It should be noted that at the time of the crisis in 2007-8, US treasury officials and their advisors focussed 
attention solely on US trade deficits with China and other Asian economies as the source of inflows into US 
securities (the ‘savings glut’ thesis) and only later was there a realisation that there were also heavy European 
inflows into US securities, with leverage playing a more significant role here. 
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 Figure 2. US annual capital flows ($ trillions) 
 
 
Figure 3. Foreign Ownership of US Treasuries (percentage of total market) 
 
Source: Council on Foreign Relations (2015) 
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Figure 4. Foreign Ownership of US Corporate Bonds/Equities (percentage of total markets) 
 
Source: Council on Foreign Relations (2015) 
 
Apart from the sheer magnitude of the US capital markets, what also attracts foreign private 
investors to them is their homogeneity and high degree of standardisation, the fact that each 
particular class of security exhibits more or less the same mix of risk and return attributes. 
The most homogeneous type of security is of course US treasuries. Beyond these though, the 
high degree to which information and disclosure standards, in addition to the rules of 
governance, are uniformly applied across the US corporate sector means that the risk-return 
characteristics of the bonds and equities issued by the large corporations rarely deviate from 
the industry average. Foreign investors, as with their US counterparts, find this homogeneity 
of the US securities markets advantageous because it allows them to make informed and cost-
efficient choices not only as to how to allocate funds to different asset classes according to 
their respective risk profiles but also as to when to switch from one asset class to another 
according to how any changes in the economic climate impact on the profiles of different 
asset classes. It is this overriding attractiveness of US securities that cements the role of the 
dollar in its various roles as an international currency. Foreign investors operating dollar 
portfolios will need to use dollars not only in a medium of exchange role (when simply 
buying and holding dollar securities) but also in a combined unit of account and medium of 
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exchange role (when selling dollar securities to buy other dollar securities) and also in a store 
of value role to bridge the gaps between sales and purchases of dollar securities. 
As previously noted, although other authors have pointed to the close connection between the 
depth of the US capital markets and the dollar’s current hegemony as an international 
currency the fact that they view securities merely as financing instruments, and bonds in 
particular merely as debt instruments, means that they can also be profoundly sceptical of the 
dollar’s continuing hegemony. The data appear to give good grounds for this scepticism for 
just as bonds now dominate the global securities markets that in turn dominate the worlds’ 
product markets (figure 1), so are these ratios manifested in the US’ percentage share of the 
world markets, lower in the product markets (22.42%) than in the financial markets 
(37.49%), and lower in the equity markets (35.11%) than in the bond markets (38.88%). Now 
if bonds are only viewed as forms of debt then it must surely follow that the US’ hugely 
disproportionate share of the world’s supply of bonds – nearly 40% of the total – has to be a 
source of great concern for foreign investors. They might initially be attracted by the liquidity 
and other advantages conferred by the large size of the US bond markets, but if this size 
grows too large there may come a point when foreign investors decide to exit these markets 
en masse because of the fear that the US cannot finance its debt in the face of a continuing 
deterioration in underlying economic fundamentals. Thus to recall Cohen’s comment: 
“Unless reversed by significant policy reform in Washington, the US economy’s dependence 
on foreign capital must be expected in time to erode the advantages historically enjoyed by 
the greenback, creating an opportunity for challengers”. And to recall Chinn and Frankel’s 
prediction made in 2008 that the euro would displace the dollar as the leading international 
currency by 2015, we find that at its core is the argument that the “chronic” deficits in the US 
trade and government sector accounts mean that the US “cannot count on being bailed out 
indefinitely” (ibid. p.67).  
By contrast, a very different perspective on dollar hegemony is opened up once bonds are 
also viewed as financial commodities whose function are to serve as stores of value. Equities 
are the other major class of financial instruments that fulfil this function, but it is bonds that 
are the more reliable instrument in this regard for the reasons discussed above. The greater 
safety of bonds as an asset class helps to explain why, at a time of increasing uncertainty in 
the global economy, global bond stocks have grown at a much faster rate than have equity 
stocks as shown in figure 1.  This ‘de-equitisation’ phenomenon may be regrettable from a 
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production standpoint22 but not from an asset management one in that institutional investors 
needing to closely match their liabilities with corresponding amounts of assets are better 
placed to do so with bonds than with equities. Now when the reality of a trend increase in the 
global institutional demand for bonds as safe stores of value is taken in conjunction with the 
reality that the US continues to be the world’s leading supplier of these stores of value it 
becomes clear why foreign investors are forced in the aggregate to stick with the dollar. 
The problem of aggregation is at the heart of the matter here. When bonds are only viewed as 
debt instruments there is no such problem because what is true at the individual level is also 
true at the collective level: just as any one foreign investor can abandon the dollar when the 
US’ debt burden is thought to be unsustainable, so can all foreign investors do the same. By 
contrast, this equivalence principle no longer holds when bonds are also viewed as 
commodities with a value storage function: any one foreign investor can at any time abandon 
US bonds but the same exit option is not open to all foreign investors taken in the aggregate 
given the huge size asymmetries in bond supplies separating the US at one end of the scale 
from the world’s EMEs at the other (table 5).  In this aggregate case the role played by the 
deterioration in the US’ trade and government accounts in regard to the dollar’s hegemony as 
an international currency is the exact opposite of the usual interpretation: rather than 
undermine the dollar’s hegemony, the deterioration in these accounts helps to strengthen it 
precisely because substantial proportions of the trade surpluses with the US generated by 
China and other EMEs have to be poured into the US’ bond markets given the relative 
underdevelopment of the bond markets in most other regions. In other words, continued 
foreign purchases of US securities amount less to a ‘bailing’ out of the US than to an 
expanded form of commodity exchange, material commodities for financial commodities 
rather than just material commodities for other material commodities.  
Confirmation of this argument would appear to be given by the patterns in the annual capital 
flow data for the US shown in figure 2 and by the data shown in figures 3 and 4. Foreign 
private capital flows into US securities rose steadily from the late 1990s/early 2000s but these 
                                                          
22 This is because, as Haldane (2014) for example explains, industrial investments are likely to be scaled back if 
corporations are not able to issue more equities and thus spread the risks of these investments more widely. 
Haldane goes on to argue that regulatory and accounting changes have helped to spur ‘de-equitisation’, but 
while this may be true it is the growing uncertainty in the globalised economy that in our view provides the 
more all-encompassing rationale for this development. Note, for example, how the recent fall in the world’s 
leading stock market indexes, caused largely by the slowdown in China’s growth rate and the resulting collapse 
in oil and other commodity prices, has served to further boost financial flows into bonds. 
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inflows became particularly heavy in the years between 2004 and 2007, a development that 
helped to fuel concerns that the US’ growing reliance on foreign capital inflows would make 
it dangerously vulnerable to any ‘sudden stop’ and reversal of those flows. As it turned out, 
there was no such sudden stop before the global financial crisis of 2007-8. Nor was there any 
stop after that crisis, as might have been expected given that it was the problems in the US 
financial sector that triggered the crisis in the first place. In fact, the contrary happened. The 
fears and uncertainties arising out of the substantial damage done to the global real economy 
by the financial crisis precipitated a global capital flight to safe haven securities, typically 
triple A rated government and corporate bonds of which the US was by far the largest 
supplier. In the case of US private investors holding foreign asset portfolios this meant a 
massive repatriation of funds back into the US in the period 2008-9. However, in the case of 
foreign private investors that were holding dollar portfolios there was no repatriation of funds 
on any similar scale as they had no choice but to hold onto US securities given the shortage 
of safe haven bonds outside of the US and a few other advanced market economies23.  
Just as the aggregation problem is that which ultimately binds foreign private agents to the 
dollar so also is this true of foreign official agents. Note from table 2 that while the dollar’s 
share of currency use in an international capacity averages 48.1% across the different 
functions of international money, it is the official reserve function where the dollar’s 
percentage share is most pronounced (61.8%). Only a very small part of this ratio is 
accounted for by governments that are formally operating a dollar anchorage policy for one 
reason or other.24 The majority part is accounted for the governments of large economy 
countries such as Japan, China and India who want to maintain their currency’s international 
value at a certain level and use its exchange rate against the dollar as the reference rate. The 
                                                          
23 As shown in figure 2 but as can also be seen more clearly in figure 1A in the appendix, the US capital 
outflows have in recent decades broadly kept pace with foreign capital inflows into the US. However, as can be 
seen in figure 2A in the appendix, the respective compositions of these flows was markedly different, with US 
investors concentrating more on higher risk foreign equities and foreign investors concentrating more on lower 
risk US bonds. Now when global economic conditions turn adverse, the switch by US investors from high risk 
equities to low risk bonds typically involve a simultaneous switch from foreign equities to domestic bonds 
because of the shortage of safe foreign bonds. This same shortage explains why, by contrast, any asset switching 
by foreign investors when conditions turn adverse will typically involve a switch from one set of dollar 
securities to another set. 
24 At the present time some 90 governments peg their currencies to the dollar (Auboin, 2012). For these 
governments who are mostly based in small, developing countries, it is GDP-related factors that are the 
dominant consideration behind dollar anchorage. These factors include trade (export or import dependence on 
the US), production (dependence on inward FDI by multinationals who produce for exports to the US or other 
dollar markets), banking (dependence on dollar denominated foreign bank loans needed to finance trade or 
government deficits) or macroeconomic stability more generally (a means of controlling domestic inflation).  
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major reason why these governments have to accumulate huge stocks of reserves in the 
contemporary era is that this is the only way that they can protect their currencies against 
sudden speculative surges. As European governments during the 1992 ERM crisis and Asian 
governments during the 1997 Asian currency crisis found to their cost, speculative vehicles 
such as hedge funds and the propriety arms of banks can today muster huge financial 
firepower when attacking a currency, firepower typically sourced out of the huge reservoirs 
of value stored in financial securities25.  And of course the major reason why such a large 
percentage of official reserve holdings have to take a dollar form is that these holdings must 
principally consist of US treasuries. If a currency is to be given effective protection against a 
speculative attack the backing reserves have to be highly liquid i.e. consist of financial 
instruments that can be sold in very large quantities in exchange for the domestic currency 
but where the sales of these instruments have a minimal impact on their price. The 
paradigmatic instruments in this regard are triple-A rated government bonds given that there 
is always a huge demand for these bonds emanating from so many different private sector 
agents (including insurance companies who need them as safe stores of value, banks who 
need them as collateral in repo transactions, and bond brokers who need them as the core 
constituents of their inventory stocks). US treasuries currently account for about 24% of the 
world’s total supply of government bonds, but if we just take the triple-A component of this 
total the US’ percentage share rises to about 80%, in other words, to a ratio that no other 
government can even begin to match.26 Thus it is that the governments of even the very 
largest economies in the world are forced to hold huge stocks of dollar denominated US 
treasuries to protect their currencies because there is nowhere else for them to go.  
To summarise, from a commodity perspective it becomes a simple matter to explain the US 
dollar’s hegemony because it then  becomes a matter of simple arithmetic: if on one side of 
the equation, there are major groups of private and official agents who need financial 
securities carrying a sufficient enough value storage capacity into which they can put their 
money, and if on the other side of the equation it is the US that is most able to supply the 
quantities of these securities in the amounts needed by foreign  agents, then the latter have 
                                                          
25 A recent illustration of this point is the Chinese government’s warning to George Soros and other speculators 
that they will use their huge dollar reserves to protect the renminbi (“Beijing warns Soros against going to war 
on renminbi, Financial Times, 27th January, 2016) 
26 In 2014, only 11 governments had a triple A rating from one or more of the three major ratings agencies, the  
US government itself only receiving triple A from Moody’s and Fitch. While Standard and Poor had 
downgraded US treasuries in 2011, this did little to prevent many of the world’s large investors, both private and 
official, from continuing to treat these securities as safe stores of value. (Guardian, October 20th,  2014) 
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little choice but to channel substantial amounts of their funds into US securities, which means 
that they have little choice but to make the US dollar their number one currency for 
international use.  This is not all. Once capital market securities are viewed as commodities in 
their own right it also becomes easy to understand why no other national or regional currency 
will soon challenge dollar hegemony because it then becomes easy to understand why no 
other national or regional capital markets will soon match those of the US in size. 
 
5. Why Dollar Hegemony Will Remain Unchallenged 
While good governance institutions are important for the development of a strong domestic 
business sector, they are absolutely vital to the development of a strong domestic financial 
sector. The point bears repeating that as securities have no intrinsic value, being nothing other 
than claims on the future income streams generated by governments and corporations, their 
value storage capacity rests entirely on the degree to which the issuing organisations can be 
trusted to return cash to investors at the required rates and at the required intervals. Given that 
bond issuers are legally obliged to pay interest, strong public governance institutions 
generally suffice to guarantee the tangibility of bonds as wealth containers (these institutions, 
which relate to the general environment within which agents operate, include the efficiency 
of the legal process, protection of property rights, judicial independence and control of 
organised crime). However, the same is not true of corporate equities: corporations can make 
profits but decide not to distribute them to investors for any number of reasons. In the case of 
equities, strong private governance institutions in addition to strong public institutions are 
required if investors are to have any faith in their wealth storage capacity ( these institutions 
relate to the internal workings of corporations and include protection of minority shareholder 
rights, strength of auditing and accounting standards and board efficacy)27. 
From these remarks, it becomes clear that the US’ current disproportionate contribution to the 
global stocks of securities essentially comes down to this country’s unique combination of 
three key factors: (i) a large domestic economic base; (ii) fairly strong public governance 
institutions; and (iii) very strong private governance institutions28. While the size of its 
                                                          
27 In its annual Global Competiveness Report, the World Economic Forum lists governance institutions as the 
first pillar of country competitiveness. These institutions are divided into two categories: ‘public’ that comprise 
16 institutions and ‘private’ that comprise five institutions. The quality of these institutions is ranked from 1 
(lowest quality) to 7 (strongest quality).  
28 In 2013, the US’s public governance institutions scored an average of 4.49 according to the WEF while the 
US’ private governance institutions scored an average of 5.74.  
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domestic economy is the major supply side determinant of the US’ securities stocks, in that it 
enables the US government and US corporations to generate the revenues needed to fund the 
sums returned to investors, it is the strength of the US’ governance institutions that are the 
major demand side determinant in that they give a high degree of assurance to investors that 
the revenues generated by US security issuers will actually be distributed to them. Given that 
debt securities must pay interest, the quality of the US’ public governance institutions is 
generally sufficient to guarantee the tangibility of US bonds, while it is the high quality of the 
US’ private governance institutions in addition to that of its public governance institutions 
that helps to maintain investor trust in the consistency with which US corporations return 
profits to shareholders29.   
Now let us turn to the Eurozone group of countries that when taken as a single entity 
certainly meets the GDP criterion determining capital market size but just as certainly fails to 
meet the governance criteria. In the absence of the sterling capital markets, the Eurozone 
capital markets never quite managed to compete in size with those of the US, a fact that was 
on its own enough to inhibit foreign inflows into the Eurozone from reaching the levels going 
to the US. However, what made matters worse was the fragmentation of the Eurozone 
markets. While the adoption of a single currency by the Eurozone member countries gave 
their securities a measure of homogeneity by eliminating  exchange rate risk, what that 
initiative could not do is to give each class of security the same high degree of homogeneity 
as exists in the case of US securities or, indeed, in the case of UK sterling securities. It could 
not do so because a single currency could not on its own compensate for the widely divergent 
quality of governance standards across the Eurozone, with high quality standards in Germany 
and other core countries and significantly poorer standards in Greece and other countries on 
                                                          
29 The argument that the US has strong governance institutions may appear to be odd given that the subprime 
crisis of 2007 broke out in the US and given that the toxic securities at the epicentre of the crisis did indeed 
break all the rules for transparency and good governance. In answer, it should be pointed out that it was 
precisely because of the fact that all the major US bond markets stuck to the usual rules that the US banking 
system was forced to step outside of the normal ‘conforming’ mortgage market and bring in extra numbers of 
‘non-conforming’ borrowers to create the raw material needed for the creation of the extra amounts of yield 
bearing securities demanded by institutional investors. Certainly, the banking sector had the opportunity (the 
exploitation of weak regulation) and the incentive (the maximisation of fee incomes) to create the toxic CDOs. 
However, the timing of events, the fact that the CDO market, which had been in existence since the early 1980s, 
only registered a twelvefold increase in size between 2003 and 2007 i.e. exactly at the time when yields were 
falling in all of the major US bond markets due to the global pressure of demand for safe stores of value, would 
indicate that imbalances outside of the banking sector had more to do with causing the crisis than the failures 
inside that sector. For further discussion see e.g. Caballero (2010); Goda et.al. (2104); Lysandrou and Shabani 
(2015) 
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the Eurozone periphery30. Nowhere was the intra-security class heterogeneity, symptomatic 
of the uneven development and application of governance standards across the Eurozone, 
more pronounced than in the government bond class with Greek government bonds, for 
example, being priced differently to German government bonds even though both of these 
bond groups were denominated in the same currency.  
Thus even before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, and the subsequent Eurozone 
crisis, when the prospects of continued Eurozone economic growth looked good, the disparity 
between the US and Eurozone securities markets in terms both of scale and degree of 
integration meant that there was little likelihood that the euro would overtake the dollar as an 
international currency because there was little likelihood that foreign private investors’ 
involvement in the Eurozone markets would surpass their involvement in the US markets. 
What the Eurozone crisis has done is to reduce that likelihood even further for the foreseeable 
future because in tearing away the thin veneer of homogeneity given to Eurozone securities 
by the single currency and exposing instead the deeper institutional asymmetries underlying 
these securities, the crisis has served to further steer many of the world’s institutional and 
other private investors towards the use of the dollar in its various international currency roles. 
A case in point is the demand for US dollars as a means of purchasing US treasuries as safe 
haven stores of value in a time of economic turbulence. Given that the supply of high grade 
Eurozone government bonds, already small by comparison with their US counterpart, was 
made even smaller by the negative impact of the Eurozone crisis on Eurozone periphery 
government bonds, one could see why the strong foreign private demand for US treasuries 
coming from large EMEs was reinforced by the strong demand coming from Eurozone 
private investors31.  
If the size and degree of integration of a country’s domestic capital markets are the ultimate 
determinants of the international standing of that country’s domestic currency, then it follows 
that China’s yuan will have even less of a chance of challenging the US dollar’s supremacy in 
the near future than has the euro. What China shares in common with the Eurozone countries 
when considered as a single entity is that it only really meets one of the three criteria behind 
capital market size, the GDP criterion. As with the Eurozone area, China’s governance 
standards are of an uneven quality, high in some sub-categories (e.g law and order, crime 
                                                          
30 Thus in 2013 Germany’s governance institutions scored an average of 5.23 according to the WEF’s annual 
competiveness report while those of Greece scored an average of 3.76  
31 See Lysandrou (2013) for more on this point. 
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prevention) and low in others (e.g protection of minority shareholders). Where China differs 
from the Eurozone is that it will find it even more difficult to raise all of its governance 
institutions to the same uniformly high level because the various impediments that have to be 
overcome in this case have to do not only with cultural factors, the weight of historically 
conditioned customs and traditions, but also with political factors, specifically the absence of 
democracy. No country can fully develop its governance institutions in the absence of a full 
commitment to the freedom of the press and to all the other institutions and practices of a 
modern, multi-party democracy and the Chinese central authorities are not about to give any 
such commitment32. 
The reason for this comes down to the magnitude of the task facing the ruling Communist 
Party in managing China’s transition from communism to capitalism. As is well known, the 
central element in that transition strategy is the staggered integration of China’s 800 million 
strong workforce into the global capitalist economy, a process that began with those parts of 
the workforce based in the coastal Special Economic Zones and that is now gradually being 
expanded to encompass the other parts of the workforce situated in the hinterland areas. 
While this transition strategy makes sense given the sheer size of China’s working 
population, its downside is that its successful implementation requires the maintenance of 
strict controls on the freedom of movement and other civil liberties, controls that are in turn 
only possible to maintain under a centralised, one-party system. Such a system is of course 
not all that inimical to inward foreign direct investments into mainland China given that what 
the foreign multinational corporations typically engaging in this type of investment most 
require is a stable, crime-free environment in which to conduct their production operations. 
By contrast, such a system is inimical to inward foreign portfolio investments because what 
the foreign institutional investors who typically engage in this type of investment require 
above all else is strong public and private governance institutions, including protection of 
minority shareholder rights, and what the strengthening of these institutions essentially 
depend on is an equally strong commitment to democracy33. 
                                                          
32 For an overview of the general relation between law, politics and governance see the collection of papers in 
Roe (2006). For a good discussion of how China’s political system impedes the development of a governance 
environment conducive to foreign portfolio investment inflows see Li and Filer (2007) and Wu, Li and Filer 
(2012) 
33 The observation regarding the correlation between the varying amounts of inward FPI and FDI received by 
China (low amounts of FPI compared to the amounts of FDI) and the varying quality of China’s governance 
institutions (weak private institutions compared to strong public institutions) has significant implications 
regarding the governance policies of other EMEs. FDI has generally been favoured on the grounds that it is more 
stable and gives rise to more positive externalities from which the domestic economy can benefit (see Moran et 
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To summarise, when financial securities are viewed as commodities with a value storage 
function it follows that a country’s governance infrastructure is as important as the size of its 
domestic economy in determining its share of global securities stocks and hence the position 
of its national currency in the international currency system. Other countries meet the GDP 
criterion for issuing large amounts of securities (e.g. China), while yet other countries meet 
the governance criteria for ensuring the tangibility of the securities issued (e.g. Germany or 
Switzerland), but only the US combines both sets of criteria in a way that allows it to be able 
to create the vast quantities of reliable stores of value required by the world’s investors, 
which is what in the end underpins dollar hegemony.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The dollar’s hegemony as an international currency has been criticized as unfair in that it 
gives the US an exorbitant privilege that no other country can enjoy. This criticism is in our 
view justified, as are the calls for a complete overhaul of the international currency system so 
as to make it a fairer, more equitable system. However, until such time as the configuration of 
political, economic and social forces necessary for this overhaul is in place, it is important to 
understand the nature of the international currency system that we will continue to have in the 
interim. The central argument of this paper is that such an understanding ultimately comes 
down to how one views financial securities, the stuff of the world’s capital markets that now 
dominate the world’ product markets. View securities as only a type of financing instrument 
and you raise the possibility that the present international currency pyramid will dissolve into 
fragments. View securities as also a type of commodity and this possibility turns out to be an 
illusion: the currency pyramid will remain solid. View securities as only a type of financing 
instrument and you inevitably raise the question as to what other currency can challenge the 
dollar: “ If not the dollar, what?” . View securities as also a type of commodity and the 
                                                          
al., 2005) as compared to the FPI mode that can be more volatile (see Hausmann and Fernadez-Ariaz, 2000). 
However, FDI can also have disadvantages amongst which is its tendency to force domestically owned firms into 
lower productivity sectors (see Hanson, 2001, and Loungani and Razin, 2001; Moran et al., 2005), while FPI has 
the advantages that it enables domestic firms to share the risks of investment without loss of managerial control 
and that it potentially improves the efficiency of domestic financial markets (see Wilkins, 1999, and Government 
of India, 2005). EMEs are thus likely to maximise the benefits of foreign investment inflows by relying on a 
particular mix of the two contrasting modes rather than simply relying on one mode and what this entails is a 
strengthening of both public and private governance institutions. For further discussion of this point, see Goda 
et.al. (2016) 
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question turns out to be redundant: it is still the dollar, and will remain the dollar. That is 
what. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1A. Foreign Ownership of US Assets and US Ownership of Foreign Assets 
 
 
 
Source: Council on Foreign Relations (2015) 
 
Figure 2A. Portfolio Risk 
 
 
Source: Council on Foreign Relations (2015) 
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